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 Abstract
In Southern Alberta, agriculture is the largest water user.  Thirteen irrigation districts plus 
numerous private irrigators hold licenses to withdraw more than 75% of the available surface 
water.  Water use decisions made by farmers in irrigation districts have significant impacts on 
the productivity of water use and on environmental outcomes (instream flow needs) throughout 
the South Saskatchewan River Basin (SSRB), especially during periods of drought. 
  The objective of this paper is to investigate the current and alternative water allocation 
strategies and their effects on crop choices with a focus on the irrigation districts in the Bow 
River Sub-basin of the SSRB.  A mathematical programming model is developed to optimize 
economic returns from crop production, subject to specified restrictions imposed by water 
supply, institutional and hydrological conditions, production technology and land characteristics.  
Positive Mathematical Programming is used for model calibration with data from 2002-2003 
provided by Alberta Agriculture Food and Rural Development.  This research provides an 
explicit framework for the design and comparison of water policy options in Southern Alberta.  
The findings provide information to address the twin objectives of increasing the productivity of 
agricultural water use and meeting the environmental flow requirements of the Bow River Basin. 
Keywords:  Irrigation; Instream flow requirements; Positive Mathematical Programming 






  iiPolicy Instruments and Agricultural Water Allocation 
in the Bow River Basin of Southern Alberta
 
1.  Introduction 
 
Many economic instruments and incentives have been studied and applied in numerous countries 
to encourage water conservation and reallocation.  However, defining and choosing effective 
policy options that meet economic objectives and environmental goals remains a challenge to 
planners and policy makers.  In many countries, agriculture is the largest water user, and in 
regions where water is scarce, irrigation water is often the focus of policy action.  Producers who 
depend on irrigation may respond to policy decisions in ways that have complex effects on water 
quantity, quality, and on the economy as a whole. 
In the semi-arid, southern half of the Canadian province of Alberta, increasing demand for 
water to meet population growth, industrial use, municipal needs, irrigation demand, and climate 
change have drastically altered the historical equilibrium between water demand and supply.  
Southern Alberta is home to nearly 60% of the provincial population and almost all of the 
irrigated land yet Southern Alberta has less than 20% of the province’s average annual surface 
water supply. 
The South Saskatchewan River Basin is composed of the sub-basins of four main river 
systems: the Bow River Sub-Basin, the Oldman River Sub-Basin, the Red Deer River Sub-Basin, 
and the South Saskatchewan River Sub-Basin.  Under an inter-provincial water sharing 
agreement, half of the annual water accumulation in the Alberta portion of the SSRB must be 
allowed to pass to downstream provinces, Saskatchewan and Manitoba.  Within Alberta, a 
system of tradable, appropriative water rights is used to help allocate water between consumptive 
uses and instream flow needs, such as the support of aquatic flora and fauna and riparian 
ecosystems. 
  1Some water use decisions made by farmers in irrigation districts have significant impacts 
on the productivity of water use and on instream flow uses throughout SSRB, especially during 
low flow periods.  Recently, several policy instruments have received much local attention: 
water pricing, development of off-stream storage capacity, and short-term trading of water rights 
(Horbulyk and Lo, 1998; Mahan et al., 2002; Alberta Environment, 2003; Horbulyk, 2005).  
However, the compound effect of these policies on diverse users at the sub-watershed level 
makes it crucial to understand their interaction and to identify opportunities for coordination of 
these policy options to realize efficient irrigation water management. 
The objective of this paper is to investigate current and alternative water allocation 
strategies and their effects on crop choices with a focus on the irrigation districts in the Bow 
River Basin of the SSRB.  The specific questions addressed are: 
  What are the critical water-induced stresses for the predominant crops?  Can adjusting 
cropping location or encouraging short-term trading of water entitlements alleviate these 
stresses? 
  What are the impacts of different water policies on the existing cropping systems? 
  How much does social welfare in irrigation districts change under alternative water allocation 
strategies? 
  The paper is organized as follows.  There is an overview of water consumption across 
economic sectors and identification of selected policy issues in the Bow River Basin and its 
legislated irrigation districts.  These include issues of water allocation transfers (especially 
within the agriculture sector and within individual irrigation districts), off-stream storage systems, 
expansion of irrigated land area and environment protection.  The methodology of mathematical 
programming is shown to integrate examination of these issues and allows one to simulate 
  2decision making and policy analysis at the irrigation district level first, then for the entire Bow 
River Basin.  A general modeling framework for the Bow River Basin and a specific 
mathematical programming model for three irrigation districts are presented.  Numerical results 
are followed by conclusions and policy implications.  
2.  Bow River Basin and Irrigation Districts  
The Bow River is the largest tributary of the South Saskatchewan River System.  It contributes 
nearly 43 percent of the 9,500 million cubic meters of average annual combined flows that form 
the South Saskatchewan River (BRBC, 2005).  The Bow River Basin (BRB) is situated south of 
the Red Deer River Basin and north of the Oldman River Basin.  Below the confluence with the 
Oldman River, the basin is known as the South Saskatchewan River Sub-basin.  The Bow River 
Sub-basin receives surface water flows from two main tributaries, the Bow and Elbow Rivers, 








Figure 1: Bow River Sub-Basin in Alberta, Canada (Source: http://www.urbanswm.ab.ca/). 
 
  The main consumptive users of river water are the City of Calgary, industry (including 
oilfield injection, oil and gas plants, food processing, and aggregate washing) and agriculture.  
Upstream of Calgary, there is a network of hydropower facilities in the upper Bow River basin, 
  3extending from Banff to Calgary.  There are 11 generating stations with one storage reservoir on 
the Bow and five on other tributaries.  Public water managers control main-stem river flows and 
withdrawals to provide for minimum instream flow needs, although the adequacy of these levels 
is the subject of considerable popular debate.  Reservoirs along the river system are used for 
recreational and tourist activities.  About 1.12 million people live in the Bow River watershed, 
with more than 80% of them resident in Calgary.  Compared to historical values, residential and 
recreational use of water from the Bow River has impacted the river’s rate of flow, water quality, 
fish populations, and aquatic plant communities.  The human population of the basin is expected 
to grow by about 50% to 1.65 million by 2030, which could impose further stresses on the Bow 
River (Hydroconsult, 2002). 
Since the late 1800s, irrigated agriculture has depended upon the Bow River network.  
Agriculture is the largest water consumer in the three primary irrigation districts: the Bow River 
Irrigation District (BRID), the Western Irrigation District (WID), and the Eastern Irrigation 
District (EID).  The livestock industry and domestic water supply for the rural population also 
depend on surface water withdrawal from Bow River, with relatively limited reliance on 
groundwater. 
  Despite limited rainfall, the Bow River Basin is well suited for irrigated agriculture, with 
more frost-free days than most parts of the province, good soils for growing a variety of crops, 
and little potential for water erosion in most parts of the basin due to the adoption of 
conservation tillage, reductions in summer fallow area and prudent crop rotation (AAFC, 2000, p. 
68).  The BRID, WID and EID are licensed to withdraw almost 1,700 Million m
3 (gross 
diversion) of water annually from the Bow.  Water allocation licenses for agriculture are 
essentially fixed upper limits, while the actual volume of water used by the irrigation districts 
  4varies considerably from year to year.  Figure 2 depicts the change of diversion over 28 years in 
these three irrigation districts.  The observed variation of annual irrigation water diversion from 
the Bow River is mainly due to variation in precipitation and temperature during the growing 
season.  For example, in a normal year like 1997, the total volume of water diverted by irrigation 
districts was about 68% of the licensed volume.  These irrigation districts diverted about 84% of 
their licensed allocation in the extremely hot summer of 1988 whereas only 40% of the 





















































































Figure 2:  Record of Water Diversion for Irrigation Use  
   Source: (AAFRD, 2004) 
 
Not surprisingly, within the boundaries of the legislated irrigation districts, irrigated 
agricultural production predominates, and only very small portions of land that are irrigable with 
existing works are cultivated on a dryland basis.  The principal limit to the expansion of irrigated 
land in each district is security of additional water supply.  The major crops grown in the three 
irrigation districts are cereals, forages and oilseeds. 
  5Much effort has been made by irrigation district managers and crop producers to improve 
irrigation efficiency at the head works, distribution and farm levels.  In the late 1970s and early 
1980s, seepage losses were a substantial factor, with about 18% of irrigated lands in the Bow 
River Basin affected by salinity and water logging.  Since then, many canals have been lined and 
pipelines have been installed to reduce seepage and evaporation.  Other initiatives by the farmers 
and the districts have been to reduce return flows
1 to make more efficient use of diverted water, 
to decrease canal maintenance costs, to improve water quality in the larger river basin, and to 
improve public perception of their management practices (BRBC, 2005).  
Alberta has been described as “... a global leader in irrigation technology and manage- 
ment ...” (Klassen, 2002).  Rehabilitation of canals is 57% complete in the BRID and seepage 
losses are now estimated to be only 2.2%.  In the EID, rehabilitation is about 32% complete and 
seepage losses are estimated at 2.6%.  The WID has a longer conveyance system compared to the 
area being irrigated, and only 18-20% of its 1200 km of canals has been rehabilitated.  Seepage 
losses have been reduced to 6.8% of its licensed volume (BRBC, 2005).  Most farmers have 
switched to low pressure, drop tube, center pivot sprinklers that are far more technically efficient 
than the surface (flood) irrigation or wheel-move systems used in the past.  As estimated for 
2003, the irrigation efficiency was 69% for BRID, 64% for EID, and 57% for WID. 
2
  Conflicts among irrigators, recreationists and environmental groups may occur in a 
drought year, when the irrigation districts have limits placed on their diversions to make water 
available for non-crop uses.  In drought years, such as 2001 and 2002, the irrigation districts 
                                                 
1 Return flow is the surplus water returned to a river system through natural drainage of irrigation diversions.  
Recent studies show irrigation return flow to be largely a factor of infrastructure characteristics, on-farm irrigation 
methods and district management. 
2 Authors’ calculation for 2003.  Values represent the weighted average of published efficiency estimates based on 
the area of irrigated land covered by each type of irrigation technology in each irrigation district.  The proportion of 
land irrigated with each method is used as the weight for calculation.  The principal irrigation methods applied in 
these irrigation district estimates are pivot, wheel move, gravity, and micro. 
  6limited their water withdrawal to meet the minimum instream flow needs and to meet the inter- 
provincial flow apportionment agreement.  These adjustments constrain crop production in the 
irrigation districts and may trigger water transfers within or among districts under the existing 
legislation.  Many stakeholders also believe that monetary incentive polices will promote the 
wise use of water, and that greater investment in off-stream storage capacity would be a 
beneficial strategy for irrigation districts to reduce their production risk in drought periods. 
3.  Research methodology 
3.1 Conceptual framework 
In Alberta, three categories of models have been used frequently to analyze water policy: 
economic optimization models, simulation models (physical and economic), and combined 
optimization and simulation models.  Recent economic optimization models of water use and 
transfers on a larger “basin scale” for the SSRB include Horbulyk and Lo (1998), Mahan et al. 
(2002) and Cutlac and Horbulyk (2004).  These models use economic optimization algorithms 
that reallocate water use according to its social or private marginal value.  They show the 
economically optimized uses of water across sectors of the economy and across sub-basins with 
appropriate calibration, although they are at a very high level of aggregation or abstraction.  
Simulation models in use at the basin level are the Water User Analysis Model (WUAM) 
(Environment Canada, 1994) and Water Resources Management Model (WRMM) (Alberta 
Environment, 2002).  WUAM describes aspects of the SSRB across Alberta and Saskatchewan, 
while WRMM looks at only the Alberta portion of the SSRB.  Both of these models employ 
information on physical infrastructure, hydrology, and the priority of licences.  A model that 
combines economic optimization analysis with simulation is the Farm Financial Impact and Risk 
Model (FFIRM) (AAFRD, 2002a).  This model uses the Irrigation District Model (IDM) 
  7(AAFRD, 2002b) and the WRMM in an iterative fashion to simulate irrigation water demand 
and supply in order to provide economic analysis, such as testing the risks and impacts of water 
supply deficits on income at the representative farm level across the basin.  The advantage of this 
simulation model that contains economic parameters is that it can help policy makers and 
analysts to think not only in terms of physical or climate conditions that can affect water users’ 
consumption behavior, but also allow them to see the interaction between human behavior and 
natural/physical settings with respect to water availability.  However, this farm-level modeling 
approach is hampered by the difficulty in combining the economic model and hydrological 
simulation model iteratively in the same platform. 
  The modeling approach taken here builds on these simulation and optimization models.  
Figure 3  gives the conceptual model framework for the entire Bow River Basin and the 
interactions among agriculture and other water consumers, including effects on water demand,  






























































Figure 3:  Bow River Sub-Basin Model 
  8return flow, and social welfare.  
  This model of decision-making within each irrigation season simulates the production, 
market (considering output price) and environmental conditions faced by irrigation districts in 
the Bow River watershed.  The objective function allocates expected seasonal water supplies to 
maximize economic returns (producers’ surplus plus any water fees) subject to a specific set of 
hydrological, technological and institutional constraints.  The hydrological constraints describe 
surface flow in the river channel, precipitation, soil moisture and local water storage options.  
The technological constraints include diverse irrigation methods and water application 
efficiencies, water application rates and other input factor intensities along with corresponding 
crop yields.  The institutional and legal constraints reflect the assignment of water rights 
(including the terms of licensed access to divert surface water for irrigation) and allowable uses.  
There are important linkages between the combination of these constraints and the resulting 
potential for water re-allocation among users and mitigating any external cost that is generated. 
  Figure 4 depicts the model framework for the agricultural sector.  Surface water is 
diverted to three irrigation districts according to their licenses and irrigated acreage.  Temporary 
transfers of water entitlements are allowed among irrigation districts; however, this serves as an 
optional feature in the model that can be turned on and off according to the policy under analysis.  
Surplus water can be returned back to rivers or pumped into off-stream storage.  Irrigation water 
demand is defined by crop mix decisions in each irrigation district where the production that can 
maximize the producers’ surplus is constrained by water availability, input costs, output price, 
and production technologies. 
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Figure 4:  Irrigation District Model of Bow River Basin  
(ID means irrigation district) 
 
 
3.2 The Data and Mathematical Programming 
Based on the model framework in Figure 4, a mathematical programming model is developed to 
optimize the welfare generated from surface water use in the irrigation districts in the Bow River 
Basin, subject to constraints such as water supply (surface water from precipitation and the Bow 
River), institutional and legal requirements (surface water license caps, instream flow 
requirements and downstream water apportionment agreements), production technology, and 
land classification (irrigated land, non-irrigated land, and dry land that has the potential to 
become irrigated land).  The model allows decision-making at the district level in each irrigation 
season and allocates expected seasonal water supplies to maximize producers’ surplus subject to 
a specific set of social, physical, and technological constraints. 
  Data from 2002-2003 were used with the 2003 cropping pattern as the base activity level.  
Data on irrigation practices, input costs, yields levels, and water requirements for irrigated crops 
were collected by AAFRD from BRID, EID and WID (AAFRD, 2004).  Although the model 
takes into account effective rainfall, it may overestimate the true irrigation requirement because 
  10it does not consider water use from stored soil moisture.  Table 1 describes some of the main 
characteristics of each irrigation district and the producers’ surplus level under the 2003 water 
supply conditions.  The WID is located upstream of both BID and EID and holds 11% of the 
total irrigation water rights in the Basin.  The BRID and EID have adjoining and overlapping 
access and return flow to the Bow River. 












3 Million m 
3  % 
Bow River Irrigation District Cereal  36 141.76 554.87 345 0.33 
Forage  32 113.41
Specialty crops 20 76.85
Oilseed  12 41.04
Eastern Irrigation District  Cereal  24 148.98 939.58 566.83  0.28 
Forage  64 332.33
Specialty crops 7 52.71
Oilseed  5 38.39
Western Irrigation District  Cereal  24 45.34 197.78 158.69  0.42 
Forage  65 97.17
Specialty crops 6 7.31
Oilseed  5 16.44
Source: AAFRD (2003) 
* return flow rate is the average percentage of annual diversion that returns to the river channel.  
Crop Pattern
 
% of area 
 
  The Positive Mathematical Programming (PMP) approach is used for model calibration.  
PMP is an approach developed to incorporate both marginal and average cost and revenue 
information into a regional optimization model.  This approach allows precise calibrations in 
acreage, production and prices (Howitt, 1995).  Traditional regional models have relied on 
average production information, but not marginal conditions.  However, marginal conditions are 
key determinants of the short-run and long-run equilibria.  Risk, requirements for crop rotation, 
exogenous government programs, and other resource constraints can influence the marginal costs 
and revenues among crops.  Not all farms enterprises have the same, average set of conditions, 
  11and therefore the marginal cost and revenue curves do not coincide with the average cost and 
revenue curves.  Consequently, one observes a diversity of crop activities in a region instead of 
an “average” or homogeneous pattern that sees all firms only produce the same crops.  PMP can 
integrate the marginal value of resources (derived from shadow prices) to augment the average 
cost and revenue information and calibrate a regional model to a baseline condition.  This allows 
the model to predict a more diverse set of activities than would be possible with a simple linear 
framework. 
  The PMP approach is now widely used as a calibration method for the specification of 
programming models designed for policy analysis (Heckelei, 2002).  Heckelei and Britz (2000) 
apply PMP in the Common Agricultural Policy Regional Impact Analysis programming model.  
Johnson et al. (2003) use PMP to calibrate observable individual farm-level parameters using 
profit maximization as their objective function.  The Central Valley Production Model is a PMP-
calibrated model developed by the California Department of Water Resource (DWR).  This CVP 
Model was tested with out-of-sample predictions of regional crop acreage changes during a 
recent drought period.  The CVPM predictions for crop acreage with three contract crops (sugar 
beets, tomatoes, and subtropical orchard) had a 14-23% error while the remaining nine crops had 
prediction errors below 7%.  Regional crop acreage was predicted for eleven regions and all 
regions had crop acreage prediction errors below six percent (Howitt, 2005, p. 64).  An extended 
and improved version of CVPM covering the entire State of California, re-named California 
Agricultural Model (CALAG), is also calibrated using PMP (DWR, 1997). 
  The standard PMP approach is applied in three steps.  First, one adds calibration 
constraints to a dual problem which bind the activity level to observed base year data and solves 
the problem to get the marginal value of the calibration constraints.  Second, one uses the 
  12marginal values from calibration constraints to estimate the parameters of a quadratic cost 
function of output quantities.  In the third step, one specifies a nonlinear objective function using 
the calibrated parameters and removes the calibration constraints to reproduce the base year 
activity level to check if the model calibrates. 
  The calibration of the mathematical programming model can be compactly written as 
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Where: 
A  Cultivation area 
A  Cultivation area in base year 
Y  Yield 
  13a0, a1,a2 Coefficient of yield response function (for actual yield) 
C  Unit cost of input 
d, dd  Irrigation district 
ETA  Actual crop evapotranspiration or consumptive use 
ETP  Potential crop water use when water is not limiting 
I  Input factor items 
kay  Crop water use coefficient 
L  Land type and irrigation system 
L   Total available land 
P  Prices of output 
precipitation  Precipitation 
Q  Irrigation requirement 
r  Input quantity 
S  Soil moisture 
T  Water for trading 
VMP  Value of marginal productivity of input 
W  Water price 
withdrawal  Withdrawal from river 
WR  Licensed accessible water 
xc  Crop types 
YM  Maximum yield 
 
Equation (1), the objective function, maximizes the combined sum of crop production 
profit of all irrigation districts under the constraints of land (equation (2)), water (equation (3)), 
and the water trading opportunity (equation (7)).  Equation (3) is the quadratic yield function for 
irrigated crops.  Equation (4) states the irrigation water requirement after subtracting the 
available rainfall and soil moisture.  Withdrawal /diversion/ transfer of surface water cannot 
  14exceed the limit of the licensed water right by an irrigation district ((5) and (6)).  Equation (7) 
indicates that the trades are unidirectional—a buyer from another district cannot sell water back 
to the same irrigation district contemporaneously.  Equations (8) and (9) are PMP calibration 
constraints on acreage and actual water application, which will force the model to produce 
results close to the base level. 
The cost function can be derived from the above setting.  The general formula of this cost 
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The constraint equations (8) and (9) are relaxed in the new objective function after model 
calibration. 
4.  Policy Scenarios to Reduce the Water Demand and Model Results 
As long-term (2011 to 2014) goals, Alberta’s “Water for Life” Strategy states “water is managed 
and allocated to support sustainable economic development and the strategic priorities of the 
province; the overall efficiency and productivity of water use in Alberta has improved by 30% 
from 2005 levels by 2015” (Alberta Environment, 2003).  Rather than coping or responding to a 
future water supply shortage, the government seeks proactively to reduce water demand and to 
achieve optimal reallocation through economic instruments and other policy tools. 
  15This highlights questions about the possible allocative and welfare impacts of pricing 
water or of short-term water trading among users?  To assess these impacts, the base case water 
supplies are retained and new policies are treated as an alternative to water supply reductions.  
With the optimizing model used here, one can predict the water users’ best response to 
alternative policy regimes.  The result yields a new level and distribution of producers’ surplus 
and government’s revenue from water and irrigated land under each policy scenario.  One result 
of the alternative policies may be to change the agents’ objectives or constraints in a manner that 
provides an irrigation district with incentive to alter its crop mix or irrigation intensity, thereby 
changing related estimates of social welfare for the basin. 
Scenario 1: Water Pricing 
Higher water prices will encourage farmers to move to higher valued crops only if there is a 
direct relationship between the price changes and the water volume received (Perry, 1996).   
When the irrigation charges are area-based, water has a marginal cost of zero, and its price will 
not induce the farmer to save water or move to high value products.  This is generally the case in 
the Bow River Basin.  Although water consumers in Alberta have to pay for some of the fixed 
costs of water management and water infrastructure, at the margin, water is literally free for 
major users in Alberta (Carpay, 2003).  Irrigation water charges are not based on a volumetric 
measure but on the acreage that is irrigated (Table 2). 
  Higher volumetric charges can encourage an appreciable change in crop mix only if 
producers perceive water costs to be significant in relation to gross margin.  If marginal water 
charges are a very small fraction of net revenues earned, they will have no significant allocative 
effects.  This appears to be the case in the study area according to Figure 5. 










   
 
2000  14.5  7.5  $16.25 + pressure surcharge*    
2001  14.5  7.5  $16.25 + pressure surcharge     
2002  14.5  7.5  $16.25 + pressure surcharge     
2003  15.0     7.5**  $16.25 + pressure surcharge     
2004    14.5*  7.5  $16.25 + pressure surcharge     
Source: AAFRD, 2005. 
 
*   An additional levy is charged for areas serviced by a pressure pipeline. 
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Figure 5:  Estimated Water Shadow Prices of Irrigation Districts 
  Figure 5 shows that the shadow prices are very small until the licensed water usage drops 
substantially in these irrigation districts.  The rather flat lines imply that the elasticity of water 
demand is low.  A relatively high water price level is a prerequisite to have impacts on water use 
behavior.  In this specific scenario, the results are based on a weighted average of shadow prices 
for the three irrigation districts, “as if” in a season where they face a 30% shortage of water 
relative to the 2003 level.  
  17Scenario 2: Short-term trading among irrigation districts 
Surface water in this basin is managed according to the principle of historical priority of rights, 
or “first in time, first in right.”  The earliest licensee is entitled to receive the entire quantity of 
water in the license before the next licensee can receive any water at all, and so on.  Water 
transfer is a reallocation of water among water licensees and may serve as an alternative to 
enforcing this priority system in times of drought or insufficient flows.  Senior water licenses can 
be transferred to junior users, in an effort to provide water to those who need it most at that point 
in time.  These transfers can happen as an impersonal market transaction or through some form 
of cooperation or voluntary sharing arrangement. 
  Legislation in Alberta provides for the transfer of an allocation of water held under a 
license from one parcel of land to another, whether owned by the same or another licensee.  
There are two basic types of transfer in Alberta: permanent transfers and temporary transfers; 
that is, part or all of the allocation of water can be transferred on a permanent or temporary basis.  
In an irrigation district, irrigation water can be transferred among or within irrigation districts 
under legislation that is distinct from that governing transfers among other individuals or 
(private) licensees.  Temporary transfers of irrigation water within an irrigation district are 
administratively very simple, and there is some evidence to suggest this market has been active 
(Chinn, 2004).  Nevertheless, the utilization of formal irrigation water markets in Alberta has 
been limited.  High transaction costs could be one factor that impedes market activity for formal 
transfers.  Smoothing the transfer processes and administrative procedures could encourage 
trading behavior by an irrigation district that values water more than another.  Figure 6 illustrates 
the amount of water that might be able to be traded among irrigation districts when there is a 
water shortage and the transaction cost of trading water is zero.  Using these base data, it appears 
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Figure 7:  Social Welfare Changes Under Two Policy Scenarios 
  19that the EID is most likely to be the irrigation district to sell water to other irrigation districts 
when facing a shortage.  Recall, this district historically has the largest volume of licensed water 
among these three irrigation districts.  
  Figure 7 compares the welfare changes under two policy scenarios.  Scenario 1 (water 
pricing) results in a reduction in producers’ surplus, but government can capture this as revenue 
from priced water.  The total level of related economic welfare is higher than the base level.  In 
Scenario 2 (short-term water trading), the aggregate welfare does not change much from the base 
level, even when facing a 30% reduction in allowable water diversions for irrigation district use. 
 Short–term  water  trading  may also achieve the same kind of cropping pattern as water 
pricing does.  Table 3 gives the change of cropping mix in three irrigation districts measured 
from the base level to those achieved in the water pricing scenario and the short-term trading 
scenario.  In the water-pricing scenario, the water shadow price associated with water constraints 
at 70% of the 2003 water withdrawal level was used, and this same 30% water shortfall is 
applied to trading scenario.  Table 3 shows that all irrigation districts reduce their irrigated area. 
The direction and magnitude of changes are the same under these two policy scenarios. 
 
Table 3:  Cropping Area Change from the Base Level under two Policy Scenarios 
 
  Scenario 1    Scenario 2 
  BID EID WID    BID EID WID 
          
Cereal -19.97%  -19.33%  -15.45%  -19.88%  -19.23%  -15.38% 
Forage -20.10%  -19.42%  -19.47%  -20.00%  -19.33%  -19.38% 
Specialty 
crops  -13.58%  -10.57%  -11.04%  -13.52%  -10.52%  -10.99% 
Oilseed -28.27%  -25.18%  -17.11%  -28.18%  -25.10%  -17.02% 
 
  205.  Conclusions 
This paper employs a mathematical programming model to analyze alternative water policies 
that may be relevant to water allocation in the Bow River Sub-basin of the South Saskatchewan 
River.  Two policies (water pricing and short-term water trading) are analyzed for a situation 
where water supplies are 30% below typical flow rates.  In the water-pricing scenario, producers’ 
surplus decreases and government revenue increases, where the gains in government revenue 
outweigh losses in producer surplus and generate an overall increase in social welfare.  In the 
water-trading scenario, changes in producers’ surplus are negligible.  In both scenarios, 
production of cereal, forage, specialty crops and oilseeds decreased by similar magnitudes.
  Much remains to be done in these and related analyses of water policy in the SSRB.  A 
better understanding of the physical, technological, institutional and economic dynamics 
affecting water consumption and replenishment will require more detailed data.  For example, a 
better understanding of crop response functions at the regional level would be useful for 
understanding the impact of changes in water allocation on agricultural production.   
Additionally, risk could be incorporated into the mathematical programming model by including 
rainfall and weather probabilities.  To examine the effects on long-term decision-making, the 
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